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‘Identity Politics’ and Property in the Trump/Brexit Era 
 
Sarah Keenan* 
 
In the aftermath of the Brexit and Trump victories, many on the left have been quick to 
blame ‘identity politics’ for the left’s failure to mobilise the ‘white working class’ in revolting 
against the inequalities brought about by neoliberalism. This analysis is based on simplistic 
and often flawed representations of who voted for both victories,1 a false equation of 
‘identity politics’ with a narrow form of liberal identity politics, and a profound failure to 
grasp the racialized and gendered structure of labour, and therefore of capitalism.2 While 
this analysis sees class as a useful category because it is conceptually tied to understandings 
of labour and capitalism, race, gender, sexuality and ability are dismissed as being 
analytically underdeveloped and marginal or even detrimental to anti-capitalist struggles.  
And yet critical race and feminist scholars have a significant and nuanced body of work 
providing an analysis of identity as material and structural to capitalism. Some of these 
scholars, such as Katherine Franke, have explicitly and powerfully addressed this most 
recent dismissal of identity politics,3 and I don’t seek to replicate that work here. Suffice to 
say that dismissing ‘identity politics’ not only trivializes decades of practical struggle and 
intellectual work, but also (as Franke argues) constructs the lives and interests of white men 
as the neutral, unmarked terrain around which a politics of ‘common interest’ can and 
should be built.4 Those dismissing identity politics are in fact asserting white male identity 
politics. 
 
White male identity politics is nothing new, and feminists and critical race theorists have 
already produced ample conceptual tools to understand and fight it. In particular, we know 
that identity must not be reduced to social categories that appear as fixed end products of 
seemingly unbreakable political and economic structures. Rather, we have to understand 
identity as material and as constantly being produced and reproduced by an array of social, 
legal, economic and other factors. The focus of my research, and the subject of this 
comment, is insights into the material nature of identity offered by feminist and critical race 
work on property. What this work shows and the key point of my comment, is that identity 
is inseparable from property. To construct identity as being about trivial self-interest, and 
property as being about straightforward material needs and resources is to misunderstand 
both. Particularly in this era of the immediate wake of the populist Trump and Brexit 
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Trump?’, LSE Brexit Blog, 10 November 2017 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/10/why-are-the-white-
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victories, ‘identity’ must not be seen as a distraction from material inequality, but rather as 
an essential aspect of it. Critical engagement with property is one way of doing that. 
 
Property was understood by western Enlightenment philosophers as an essential part 
and/or extension of the proper subject.5 That proper subject was assumed to be white and 
male, probably also straight and able-bodied. This understanding of property contributed to 
both the enormous legal and social strength afforded to property rights (because your 
property was seen as an extension of yourself) and also to the heavy material consequences 
which came to be attached to being an improper subject.  
 
In her influential 1993 Harvard Law Review piece, Cheryl Harris famously made the 
argument that whiteness is property.6  Writing in the US context but drawing on histories 
and arguments applicable to other Anglo-European states, Harris outlined how property 
rights are rooted in racial domination, specifically white supremacy.  She sets out how 
slavery and colonial conquest – practices implemented by force and enshrined in law – 
established whiteness as a prerequisite to the exercise of enforceable property rights. So 
property was meaningless without whiteness; the two concepts grew up together in 
America. From the mid-1600s onwards whiteness was established in the US as a protected 
legal category which gave its members a wide range of social benefits from which non-white 
subjects were excluded.  These benefits included immunity from enslavement, and the 
freedom to sell land to the highest bidder. And while slavery and conquest are no longer 
legal practices, by essentially maintaining the status quo of a socio-economic system 
entrenched in racial inequality, law continues to recognise the settled expectations of white 
people that have been built on the benefits and privileges of white supremacy.  Harris sees 
whiteness as a property right which is exercised whenever a white person takes advantage 
of the privileges accorded to white people simply by virtue of their whiteness.  Today these 
privileges are not as blatant as before civil rights became formally universal, but they still 
exist in vast and complex ways (and statistics on for example white and non-white rates of 
imprisonment, poverty levels and university entrance rates all reflect the persistent 
existence of these exclusive privileges).  Harris suggests affirmative action as a means to 
undermine the property interest in whiteness because this would aim to effectively diminish 
the exclusiveness of white privilege.  So according to Harris’ conceptualization, property is 
both an essential part of the subject (one’s race) and an important relationship between 
subjects (whiteness gives tangible and exclusive privileges over non-whites). 
 
Other feminist legal theorists have also explored the idea that particular identities can 
function as property.  Engaging with Harris’ work and with other feminist understandings of 
the relational nature of identity, Margaret Davies troubles the distinction between ‘having’ 
and ‘being’, in regards to masculinity for example.  'If we accept that identity is at least 
partly an intersubjective, cultural construction and not simply a pre-social attribute’, Davies 
argues, then it follows that identities are taken from or given by cultural and social 
5 For an excellent summary of these philosophies, see Margaret Davies, Property: Meaning, Histories, Theories 
(Routledge, 2007). 
6 Cheryl I. Harris, ‘Whiteness As Property’, Harvard Law Review (1993) 106(8): 1707-1791. 
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relations.7 There is thus a sense in which identity is never one's own, but a culturally 
determined aspect of one's person – a kind of gift in process, though often an unwanted 
one. Because having and being are so culturally interwoven, Davies argues that ‘any 
question of “being” must bring with it – at some level – a question of “having”’.8  Failure to 
notice the interdependence of these ideas, she argues, may ‘lead to the re-stereotyping or 
re-freezing of identities’ which might otherwise be open to transgression.  Making the case 
for a queer theory of property, Davies is arguing here that making the linkage between 
identity (which in law is generally understood as fixed and essential) and ownership (which 
in law is generally understood as transferable and impermanent) might allow for a de-
essentialized understanding of both identity and property, and the possibility for a radical 
shift in the political consequences of both.   
 
Davina Cooper has also questioned the distinction between ownership and membership of 
identity categories in her work on property.  Cooper used belonging as a way to understand 
the overlap between property as ownership and property as membership.  Based on an 
empirical study of a school with unique and alternative property practices, Cooper found 
that these property practices involve a number of intersecting dimensions, of which 
belonging is the most important part. Cooper considers belonging in two ways: firstly the 
relationship whereby an object, space, or rights over it belong to a subject (‘subject-object’), 
and secondly the constitutive relationship of part to whole whereby attributes, qualities or 
characteristics belong to a thing or a subject (‘part-whole’).9  Both types of belonging 
implicate social relations and networks that extend beyond the immediate subject and 
object of property; property is instead understood as ‘a set of networked relations in which 
the subject is embedded’.10 The first understanding of belonging that Cooper describes 
(subject-object) fits with legal and conventional understandings of property as ownership 
(e.g. the car, as object, belongs to me the owner, as subject).  The second understanding of 
belonging that Cooper describes (part-whole) is a departure from traditional and legal 
understandings of property, but resonates strongly with Harris’ analysis of whiteness as 
property and with Davies analysis of identity as property: property as membership.   
 
Using this analysis, whiteness can be understood as property because the property-holder is 
embedded in certain social relations and networks of belonging.  A white person can enjoy 
the privileges of whiteness because he or she belongs to the various social relations and 
networks that constitute whiteness.  As sociologists such as Ruth Frankenberg have shown, 
those relations and networks are complex and far-reaching.  Whiteness, like all identity 
categories, is socially constructed through historically specific fusions of political, economic 
and other forces.11  And whiteness in turn ‘constructs daily practices and worldviews in 
7 Margaret Davies, ‘Queer Property, Queer Persons: Self-Ownership and Beyond’, Social and Legal Studies 
(1999) 8(3): 327-352, 333. 
8 Ibid 342. 
9 Davina Cooper, ‘Opening Up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and the Productive Life of 
Property’ Law & Social Inquiry (2007) 32(3): 625-664, 629. For a further exposition of this ideas see Davina 
Cooper, Everyday Utopias: The Conceptual Life of Promising Spaces (Duke University Press, 2013). 
10 ‘Opening Up Ownership’, ibid 636. 
11 Ruth Frankenberg, The Social Construction of Whiteness: White Women, Race Matters (Routledge, 1993). 
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complex relations with material life’.12  That is, whiteness is productive of subjectivities.  So 
while whiteness can be understood as belonging to the white subject as Harris argues 
(whiteness as property in the sense of subject-object belonging), the white subject also 
belongs to the complex relations and networks that form whiteness (whiteness as property 
in the sense of part-whole belonging).  This analysis suggests that in order to understand the 
varied social powers of property, both subject-object and part-whole belonging must be 
considered.  Ownership and membership are always intertwined.  Having is always linked to 
being, property to identity.  In policy terms, this analysis means that if the normative goal is 
to challenge the way whiteness (or another identity category) operates as a structure of 
exploitation and oppression, then it is the relations and networks that form whiteness which 
must be undermined rather than the narrower project of liberating or disciplining the 
individual subjects who belong to them (e.g. liberal measures such as anti-discrimination 
law and hate crime law).   
 
In my own work I have drawn on critical geography to analyze the spatiality of embedded 
relations of belonging. Building on Cooper’s work, I argue that in order to constitute 
property, the set of networked relations to which Cooper refers must not only include one 
of belonging between either subject and object or part and whole, but must also be 
structured in such a way that that relation of belonging is conceptually, socially and 
physically supported or ‘held up’.13  That is, the set of networked relations that Cooper 
describes must form a space that holds up the relation of belonging. Relations of belonging 
are held up when the wider social processes, structures and networks that constitute space 
give force to those relations.  By this I mean that they are recognized, accepted and 
supported in ways that have a range of effects and consequences.  In policy and strategy 
terms, this means that there must be a multiplicity of tactics and demands, going beyond 
legal recognition of particular relations of belonging as property. As has been pointed out by 
many indigenous scholars in particular, recognition fails to acknowledge or address the 
violence inherent in colonial orders,14 instead it brings new relations of belonging into those 
orders and thereby depoliticizes them. Because the concept of ‘holding up’ is about the 
multiplicity of processes, structures and networks that constitute space, it is directly 
concerned with these orders.  
 
So what does this mean for identity in the Trump/Brexit era? Firstly, it means that analyses 
of Trump and Brexit that see these electoral victories as being about the haves and the have 
nots are not accurate unless they acknowledge whiteness as something to be had. The 
appeal of Trump and Brexit was not only about the material promises each campaign made 
to improve imbalance in the distribution of wealth, but also the promises made to reshape 
national space such that white men would feel a sense of unbridled ownership and 
membership reminiscent of eras when both nations were more explicitly white supremacist. 
This is not because white people are ‘bad’ but because they are embedded in spaces that 
have been shaped by the white supremacist practices of colonialism and slavery, which are 
still today the material and social basis of the US and Britain (and Australia).  There has 
12 Ibid 228. 
13 Sarah Keenan, Subversive Property: Law and the Production of Spaces of Belonging (Routledge, 2015). 
14 See e.g. Irene Watson, ‘Buried Alive’, Law and Critique (2002) 13: 253-269; Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White 
Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (University of Minnesota Press, 2014). 
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never been a formal redistribution of property by way of reparations for that which was 
violently taken through these practices – instead it has become the property of those who 
have subsequently inherited or bought it. Both the Trump and Brexit campaigns were able 
to succeed because they took place in spaces that, despite gains in formal equality terms 
and a level of cultural shift, continue to hold up exclusive relations of belonging between 
white people (men in particular) and the national space.  
 
Understanding property as including identity and relying on space means that to create 
effective political change requires a multiplicity of tactics, including but not limited to 
material redistribution. This was the case before Trump and Brexit and remains the case 
today. As other commentators have pointed out, we need to understand the Trump and 
Brexit victories not as exceptional to the social and political worlds we inhabit but rather as 
their latest manifestations.  Identity matters now as it did before Trump and Brexit; 
membership is and always has been connected to ownership, having to being. As feminists 
we will continue to update our strategies in the long fight to reshape the spaces we inhabit.  
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